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ABSTRACT
In an unattended sensor network, sensor nodes can be compromised. Based on compromised
nodes, the adversary can launch various attacks and packet dropping is one of the easiest
attacks. Many schemes have been proposed to mitigate the packet dropping attack, but few
can effectively and efficiently identify the droppers. In this thesis, we propose a simple yet
effective scheme to identify packet droppers. This scheme only requires sending and forwarding
nodes to report their observations to the base station, and the base station can analyze the
reports, identify inconsistencies in the reports, and then locate the droppers. All nodes are
organized into a tree rooted at the base station and each node is required to report the number
of packets it has received as well as the number and the composition of packets forwarded by
its parent node on the tree, which it has overheard. Using rules we propose, the base station
can analyze the received reports to check if there is inconsistency among the reports; if some
inconsistencies are found, the base station can further infer the identities of packet droppers.
The scheme can also tolerate erroneous reports, natural packet dropping and so on. A mark-
based scheme is also proposed to identify packet dropper or modifier. Extensive simulations
have been conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the scheme.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.1 Motivation and contribution
In wireless sensor networks, each sensor node monitors the environment, detects events of
interest, produces data and collaborates in forwarding the data toward a base station, storage
node, or querying user. Sensor networks are often deployed in unattended and hostile environ-
ments. Due to the lack of physical protection, sensor nodes are subject to node compromise.
After compromising one or multiple sensor nodes, the adversary may launch various attacks to
disrupt the in-network communication. Among these attacks, the easiest one may be dropping
packets, i.e., compromised nodes drop the packets which are supposed to be forwarded.
To deal with packet dropping, a widely adopted countermeasure is multi-path forward-
ing [Budhaditya Deb et al. (2003); Thiemo Voigt et al. (2005); Suk-Bok Lee et al. (2006)],
in which each packet is forwarded along multiple redundant paths and hence packet dropping
in some but not all of these paths can be tolerated. This scheme introduces high extra com-
munication overhead. Moreover, without identifying packet droppers, this countermeasure can
not fully solve the problem because the compromised nodes can continue attacking the network
without being caught.
Some local monitoring schemes [Issa Khalil et al. (2005); Saurabh et al. (2004)] have also
been proposed for identifying packet droppers. In these schemes, all or some of nodes moni-
tor their neighboring nodes and then these monitoring nodes make decision together without
intervention of the base station. The advantage of this kind of schemes is that compromised
nodes can be found locally. However, this local decision can lead to other attacks such as bad
mouth attack [Saurabh et al. (2004)]. Moreover, the monitoring nodes should spend much
more resources than any other nodes.
2In this thesis, we propose a new scheme in which each node runs a simple monitoring module
and the base station can find out the compromised nodes without incurring other attacks as
described above. Specially, the scheme organizes all nodes into a tree rooted at the base station.
Each node is required to report the number of packets it has received as well as the number and
the composition of packets forwarded by its parent node on the tree, which it has overheard.
Using rules we propose, the base station can analyze the received reports to check if there is
inconsistency among the reports; if some inconsistencies are found, the base station can further
infer the identities of packet droppers. For example, our proposed mark-based scheme may
be used to identify packet droppers or modifiers. Extensive simulations have been conducted
using ns2 simulator. The results verify that the proposed scheme is effective, and can tolerate
erroneous reports, natural packet dropping and so on.
1.2 Organization of this thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Related works are reviewed in the chapter 2 and
the proposed scheme is explained in the chapter 3. The section 3.1 describes the network model,
security assumptions and attack model. The way the scheme works is explained in the section
3.2 and and the section 3.3 explains briefly our proposed mark-based scheme that can be used
together with the scheme proposed in this thesis work to identify packet droppers/modifiers.
The simulation results are shown in the chapter 4 and finally we conclude in the chapter 5.
3CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Dropping packets may be the easiest attackt that can be launched by compromised nodes
and unfortunately it affects the perfmance of sensor network significantly. To deal with the
packet dropping attacks launched by passive attackers who do not participate in forwarding
packets to save their battery selfishly, Afrand Agah et al. (2006) propose a scheme based on
game theory. An IDS module running on a base station plays an important role in managing
a reputation value for each node. The nodes which forward packets get high reputation values
and the nodes not doing so get low reputation values. As total reputation values accumulate,
the nodes which get negative reputation values are considered as passive attackers and a path
consisting of less number of attackers is chosen to be a winning path. As the major communi-
cation overhead of this scheme, a base station should be informed by each destination of packet
arrivals and the reputation value of a node should be periodically broadcast to the neighbors
of the node to keep their knowledge fresh.
To maintain data reliability in the presence of dropping attacks, the scheme proposed by
Budhaditya Deb et al. (2003) sends multiple copies of each packet along multiple paths from
source. The degree of redundancy introduced, is controlled according to the desired reliability,
the local channel error conditions, neighborhood information available and so on. Thiemo
Voigt et al. (2005) also present a simple routing algorithm for on-demand construction of
multiple non-interfering paths in a wireless sensor network using geographic routing. Its main
idea is that a node chooses a node as next hop only if the node’s distance from the straight
line between the source and the sink of the data transfer is at least the transmission range.
Besides mitigating data unreliability using multiple paths, the schemes with multiple paths are
also used to detect and isolate the compromised nodes which try to inject inconsistent routing
information from the network using a neighbor report system proposed by Suk-Bok Lee et
4al. (2006). In the neighbor report system, the route advertisement of a node is verified by
its surrounding neighbor nodes so that the suspected node is reported to a base station and is
excluded from the network. These multi-path schemes can improve the arrival rate of packets
at the destinations and make sensor networks more secure. However, it can also incur high
extra communication overhead.
To isolate compromised nodes that have been identified, there is watchdog mechanism [Saurabh
et al. (2004)] in which every node monitors its neighbors and decides whether they are good or
bad based on the information obtained from monitoring. Here, the decision from only one node
is not trustful and thus multiple monitoring nodes are required to exchange their monitoring
information or their opinions on whether a node is good or bad, with each other. However,
this opinion exchange incurs the so-called bad mouth attack. That is, compromised nodes may
speak ill of a victim to make other nodes believe that the victim is compromised. Additionally,
this monitoring mechanism may cause extra overhead in terms of storage and communication.
Fortunately, our proposed scheme does not make each node spend much storage - a base station
needs only three kinds of monitoring reports from sensor nodes, the communication overhead
is low and monitoring reports can be piggybacked in sensory data reports.
Unlike the aforementioned schemes in which every node monitors its neighbors, only some
nodes take the responsibility to monitor other nodes as proposed by Issa Khalil et al. (2005)
and A. P. et al. (2005). In this work, Issa Khalil et al. (2005) uses local monitoring to detect
control traffic misbehavior and local response to diagnose and isolate the suspect nodes. For a
link (i, j), the sender i is a guard node for node j. Information for each packet sent from X
to A is saved in a watch buffer at each guard for a time τ . The work proposed by A. P. et
al. (2005) is based on the inference of the network behavior obtained from the analysis of events
detected by a monitor node, i.e, the node that implements the IDS system. The monitoring
node keeps its radio in a promiscuous mode, storing relevant information and processing it
according to selected rules. However, such schemes are still vulnerable to bad mouth attacks
and introduce the communication overhead for announcing compromised nodes.
5CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND PROCEDURES
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Network model
We consider a sensor network composed of a sink (base station) and regular sensor nodes.
The network is deployed in an unattended environment for monitoring purpose. All the regular
sensor nodes and a base station form a tree rooted at the base station. Each node in this tree
can have multiple parents if it has a number of neighbors. Whenever a sensor node detects an
event, it samples its environment at a certain rate and reports sensory data at the same rate.
The rate is denoted as G. The sensory data is first sent to the parent node on the tree, which
further forwards the data to its own parent, and so on and so forth. If a sensor node does
not detect any event, it does not report any data. We assume that all sensor nodes and the
base station are time synchronized, and thus they share the same timer reference. The time is
divided into rounds, each of fixed length. As the round change, each node changes the parent
for packet forwarding to give packet forwarding information on more paths in the tree to the
base station. For example, Fig. 3.1 shows diverse packet forwarding paths. The packets from
a source 9 can travel on the path which is constructed by the nodes 7, 3 and 1 in the round
ROi and in the next round ROi+1 the packets from the the source 9 can travel through the
nodes 8, 5 and 2.
3.1.2 Security assumptions and attack model
We assume that every sensor node shares a unique pairwise key with the base station,
which is known only by the node and the base station. With this key a source encrypts the
packets which the source generates and the forwarding nodes for the packets also encrypts
6Figure 3.1 Diverse packet forwarding paths
the packets forwarded by the previous forwarding node or the source for the packets. This
encryption prevents a selective dropping by compromised nodes for specific sources. For the
decryption, each node reports its topology information after the construction of tree rooted at
the base station. The base station cannot be compromised, but any regular sensor node can
be compromised. Using compromised sensor nodes, the adversary can launch various kinds of
attacks. In this thesis, we focus on the simplest dropping attack, i.e., a compromised node may
drop some packets which are supposed to be forwarded. Besides dropping by the compromised
nodes, we consider dropping by environment such as interference whose frequency is much less
than that of dropping by compromised nodes.
3.2 Proposed scheme
The proposed dropper identification scheme includes two major components, the trans-
mission/forwarding of packets, and the transmission/forwarding and analysis of monitoring
reports. The first component ensures that packets cannot be dropped selectively based on
their sources, and the second component enables collaborative monitoring of node behaviors
and identification of packet droppers. In this section, these two components are described in
detail.
73.2.1 Information of tree topology
After deployment of sensor nodes, a multi-parents tree is established. Each node comes to
know its parents and children if it has numerous neighboring nodes and to give monitoring data
in more diverse situations, each node changes its parent in each round. Here, we add one more
data to lessen memory consumption for security. This is a random number rij for a node i to
its parent, a node j. When a node i knows which nodes are its parents, it assigns a random
number to each parent. In Fig. 3.2, a node 4 has the parents, a node 1 and a node 2 and
it assigns a random number r41 to a node 1 and r42 to a node 2. With the real identities of
the parents and children, the random numbers for the parents, the depth and the order of the
parents for rounds are sent to the base station by each node.
Figure 3.2 Random numbers for parents
3.2.2 Packet encryption and decryption
As described in the network model (Section 3.1.1), a sensor node reports sensory data at
rate G if the node detects some event. The packet containing sensory data should be encrypted
to hide the source of the packet, so as to prevent an adversary en-route node from selectively
dropping packets from particular sources. Hence, in the following we introduce the approaches
to encrypt packets by sensor nodes and to decrypt packets by the base station.
83.2.2.1 Packet encryption
Using the key which is installed before node deployment, a packet is encrypted in generation
as well as forwarding to mitigate the infiltration of false data [Sencun Zhu et al. (2004); FanYe
et al. (2007)]. However, the multiple encryption leads to more memory consumption because of
multiple identifier addition. Our approach to lessen memory consumption is a random number
which each node assigns to its parent. The random number requires less bits than the identifier
of nodes since the maximum number of parents for each node, PN is smaller than the total
number of nodes.
Encryption in packet generation
When a source generates a packet, the identifier of the source goes with the sensory data and
is encrypted to prevent selective dropping. Additionally, a packet contains a random number
which the source assigns to its parent. Eq. (3.1) is the packet format which sources use.
〈Pi, 〈rij , i,D〉ki , pad〉 (3.1)
Here, Pi is the identifier of source’s parent which is the next hop destination. rij is a random
number which a source i assigns to its parent, a node j and i is the identifier of a source. ki
is the pairwise key which a source i shares with the base station and 〈A〉ki means that A is
encrypted by a key ki. pad is an arbitrary number which keeps packet size same and hence
prevents packet dropping based on packet size. It is chopped away when a forwarding node
adds its random number. In Fig. 3.3 where a circle is a node and the number on an arrow is
the random number which the node in the tail of the arrow assigns to the node in the head of
the arrow, a source 3 assigns a random number r34 to a node 4 and a source 3 generates a
packet like in Fig. 3.4
Figure 3.3 Topology for a source
Encryption in packet forwarding
9Figure 3.4 Encryption by a source
When a node v receives a packet with the format of Eq. (3.1)(described as 〈v,m〉 more
briefly), v shifts m to the right by log(PN ) bits and its random number rvu is added. The
result is encrypted by v’s pairwise key. For example, Fig. 3.4 shows a generated packet by
a source 3 and Fig. 3.5 shows encryption in packet forwarding. In Fig. 3.6, there is a path
through which a generated packet travels. A source 3 assigns a random number r34 to a node
4 and a node 4 also assigns a random number r42 to a node 2. After a node 4 receives a
packet from a source 3, it shifts the packet to the right by log(PN ) bits and a random number
r42 is added. Then the packet is encrypted again with the pairwise key of a node 4 and the
real identity of a node 2 is added in the head of the packet.
Figure 3.5 Encryption in packet forwarding
Figure 3.6 A Path for packet generation and forwarding
With a changed packet, v sends the received one for monitoring by its children like in
Eq. (3.2). If v forwards only changed one, its children can not know whether v forwards the
packet which they sent to v or not. The next forwarding node discards the first part like 〈v,m〉
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in Eq. (3.2) and changes the second part.
〈v,m〉, 〈Pv,m′〉 (3.2)
For the overhead from the addition of random numbers, it depends on the maximum number
of parents, PN which requires at most log(PN ) bits and the number of hops. If PN is 8 and
the tree height is 20 hops (allowing the sensor network to cover about 2000m × 2000m area
if using MicaZ motes [Z. Yu et al. (2006)]), the number of extra bits introduced is 60 bits
or 8 bytes, which is not a big overhead especially when considering that, the IEEE 802.15.4
standard (followed by most of current sensor node products) allows packet length to be up to
127 bytes [Chuang Wang et al. (2009)].
3.2.2.2 Packet decryption
Due to multiple encryption, decryption also has several steps. In each decryption step, only
pairwise keys from the children of a current node become the candidate keys for decryption.
If any of the candidate keys brings the corresponding random number, the decryption process
continues until the sensory data is decrypted. If not, the packet is rejected as false injected
data. For instance, Fig. 3.7 shows one packet example which arrives at the base station whose
id is 0. The path which the packet has traveled is shown in Fig. 3.8. When the base station
receives the packet, it needs to decrypt only 〈rkl, rjk, rij , i,D〉. At first, if the base station
decrypts it with the pairwise key of a node 2, finds the random numbver r20 which a node 2
assigns to the base station. Then, r20 is trimmed and the next decryption part is 〈r42, r34, 3, X〉.
r42 can be decrypted by the pairwise key of a node 4 and this is the random number which
is assigned to a node 2 by a node 4. Finally, a pairwise key of a node 3 decrypts 〈r34, 3, X〉.
The random number r34 matches the random number which a node 3 assigns to a node 4.
3.2.3 Monitoring report transmission and analysis
In our scheme, the additional role of each node is only to monitor its parent’s behavior
and report the monitoring results. The simple monitoring reports have the relation with each
11
Figure 3.7 Packet at the base station
Figure 3.8 A Path for travel of a packet
other and the report of the base station for its received packets. This relation contributes to
the development of rules to find compromised nodes.
3.2.3.1 Constitution of report
For the report of the base station, it counts the number of packets that a source i generates
(denoted as SGi) among the received packets and with receiving of any packet from a source
i, the base station considers that the source i generates actually GGi packets which a source
should generate during a round according to the sampling rate G. The base station also counts
the number of packets that a sensor node i forwards (denoted as EFi). In Fig. 3.9, EF3 = 150.
For the report of each sensor node, a sensor node i counts the number of packets that it
has received during a round (denoted as Ri). In Fig. 3.9, R3 = 150. In addition, a sensor node
i monitors its parent, a sensor node j, during a round and tells how many packets its parent
has forwarded for its own packet(denoted as Fij). In Fig. 3.9, F13 = 50 and F23 = 100. For the
packets about which it can not recognize the source and forwarding nodes (denoted as SFij),
SFij includes the packets from the siblings and the parent. In Fig. 3.9, SF13 = 150 and SF23 =
100. To summarize, every node i should report the monitoring result as 〈Ri, Fij , SFij〉 to the
base station after every round. These reports should also be encrypted, and the procedures
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for encrypting, sending, forwarding and decrypting these reports are same as those for sensory
packets, as described in the above section.
Figure 3.9 Example of EF , GG, R, F and SF
3.2.3.2 Development of rules
The relation between the report of the base station and each node contributes to the devel-
opment of the following rules to find compromised nodes. They are organized into basic rules
and extended rules.
We use
.
= instead of = since we consider the dropping by environment such as interference
and weakness of monitoring system.
Basic Rules
The basic rules hold regardless of the number of compromised neighboring nodes since they
are based on consistent relation for the report of the base station and each node.
Rule 1: This rule is based on the relation between a node and its children for R. R of a
node is the number of packets which the node has received during a round.
Since packets which are received as well as generated by a node must reach the parent of
the node, the parent’s R is correct if its children have the correct R and the summation of (R
+ GG) for its children is close to parent’s R like in Fig. 3.10.
The formal expression of this is Eq. 3.3 where CSj is the set for the children of a node j
and the function symbol, Correct(A,B, ...) means that the arguments A, B, ... are correct.
13
Figure 3.10 Example of correct R
[∀i ∈ CSj Correct(Ri)] ∧
∑
∀i∈CSj
(Ri +GGi)
.
= Rj
⇒ Correct(Rj) (3.3)
To use this rule more efficiently, it is applied from the bottom of a tree to top; that is, from
sources to the base station. This is because R and GG of sources are already correct. R of
sources is zero and GG is calculated with sampling rate.
Rule 2: This rule is based on the relation between R and F for the nodes on a path through
which most packets arrive at the base station. If the base station receives most packets from
a source, the nodes on the path for the source can be considered as non-droppers. However,
they can falsify their report, R or F . For R, it must be close to EF for the nodes on the path
since before being forwarded by a node (corresponds to EF ), packets should be received by
the node (corresponds to R). Eq. 3.4 expresses this where Ps is a path whose source is a node
s and Drop Path(A) means that a path A includes at least one dropper. ¬f() represents the
negation of f()
With the correct R, we can find correct F . F is the number of packets which a node sends
to its parent and its parent forwards. To understand it more clearly, we show an example in
Fig. 3.11 where F12 = 50 since a node 1 sends 50 packets and a node 2 forwards all of them.
Since a node sends the generated and received packets by itself, it is true that F of a node is
close to (R + GG) of the node. In Fig. 3.11, F12 = R1 +GG1. Eq. 3.5 expresses this.
14
Figure 3.11 Example of correct R and F
[¬Drop Path(Ps)] ∧ [i ∈ Ps Ri .= EFi]⇒ Correct(Ri) (3.4)
[¬Drop Path(Ps)] ∧ [i ∈ Ps, i ∈ CSj Correct(Ri)
∧ Fij .= Ri +GGi]⇒ Correct(Fij) (3.5)
Rule 3: This rule is based on the relation among R, F and SF . SF of a node is the number
of packets which its siblings send to its parent and the parent forwards. It also includes the
packets which the parent of the node generates. To understand it more clearly, we show an
example in Fig. 3.12. The number of packets on the link from a node 3 is 150. 50 of them are
from a node 1, 100 of them are from a node 2 and a node 3 does not generate any packet.
Hence, SF13 = 100 and SF23 = 50. Additionally, F13 + SF13 = R3 + GG3 and F23 + SF23
= R3 + GG3, which means that the sum of F and SF of a node is close to the number of
packets which its parent receives and generates. The reason is that the packets which the
parent of a node receives and generates (corresponds to R+GG) should be forwarded and they
are monitored by its children (corresponds to F+SF ) if the parent of the node does not drop
packets. However, there is one case we must consider. A compromised node can falsify its F
and SF such that the sum of them is still close to (R+GG) of its parent. For instance, a node
1 is compromised in Fig. 3.13 and changes F13 to 25 and SF13 to 125. However, (F13+SF13)
is still equal to (R3+GG3). Hence, we use this rule when either F or SF is correct. Eq. 3.6 is
the formal expression of this rule where Drop(j) means that a node j drops packets.
∃i ∈ CSj [¬Drop(j) ∧ Correct(Rj)]
∧[Rj +GGj .= Fij + SFij ]
15
Figure 3.12 Example of correct F and SF
Figure 3.13 Example of wrong F and SF
∧[Correct(Fij) ∨ Correct(SFij)]
⇒ [Correct(Fij)⇒ Correct(SFij)
∨Correct(SFij)⇒ Correct(Fij)] (3.6)
Rule 4: This rule is based on the relation between F and SF . SF is the monitoring result
for the packets from the siblings of a node and its parent and F is the monitoring result for
the packet from itself. According to this definition, SF of a node includes the packets of its
siblings (corresponds to F of its siblings) and its parent (corresponds to GG of its parent).
Let’s look at Fig. 3.14 where SF13
.
= F23 + GG3 and SF23
.
= F13 + GG3. Thus, if F for the
siblings of a node is correct and SF of the node is close to the sum of F for its siblings and
GG of its parent, SF of the node is correct. Eq. 3.7 expresses this rule where SSi is the set for
the siblings of a node i.
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Figure 3.14 Example of correct F , SF and GG
∃i ∈ CSj [∀k ∈ SSi Correct(Fkj)]
∧[SFij .=
∑
∀k∈SSi
Fkj +GGj ]⇒ Correct(SFij) (3.7)
Rule 5: Based on the relation between R and F , a node can be verified as a non-dropper.
If a node does not drop packets, it forwards all the received packet and this forwarding is
monitored by its child. If the child also does not drop packets, (R+GG) of the child should be
close to F of the child since the child sends its generated and received packets to the node and
the node forwards them with being monitored by the child. For example, in Fig. 3.15, a node 1
and 2 do not drop any packet and hence R1 + GG1 = F12. However, if a node does not drop
packets but its child does, this does not hold. In Fig. 3.16, a node 2 does not drop any packet
but a node 1 drops 50 packets. Therefore, R1 + GG1 6= F12 even if R1 and F12 are correct. In
sum, if a node does not drop packets and (R + GG) for the child of the node is close to F for
the child of the node, the child of the node dose not drop packets. Eq. 3.8 expresses this.
Figure 3.15 A child and its parent do not drop packets
∃i ∈ CSj ¬Drop(j) ∧ Correct(Ri, Fij)
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Figure 3.16 A child drops packets but its parent does not
∧[Ri +GGi .= Fij ]⇒ ¬Drop(i) (3.8)
Rule 6: Like in Rule 5, this rule is also based on the relation between R and F to verify
a node as a non-dropper. If a node and its child do not drop packets, (R+GG) of the child is
close to F of the child for the correct R and F . However, if the node drops packets, (R+GG)
of the child is not close to F of the child. For instance, in Fig. 3.17, a node 2 drops 50 packets
but a node 1 does not drop any packet. Hence, R1 + GG1 6= F12.
In sum, if the child of a node does not drop packets and (R+GG) of the child is close to
F of the child for correct R and F , the node does not drop packets. Eq. 3.9 is the formal
expression of this.
Figure 3.17 A parent drops packets but its child does not
∃i ∈ CSj ¬Drop(i) ∧ Correct(Ri, Fij)
∧[Ri +GGi .= Fij ]⇒ ¬Drop(j) (3.9)
Rule 7: Based on the report from all children, it is verified whether a parent drops packets
or not. If the children of a node have correct R, the sum of (R+GG) for its children means
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the number of packets which the children of the node receive and generate. Similarly, if the
children of a node have correct F , the sum of F for its children means the number of packets
which the node forwards. These two sums must be close to each other if the node does not
drop packets. For example, in Fig. 3.18, R1 + GG1 + R2 + GG2 = F13 + F23. To summarize,
with correct R and F for the children of a node, if the sum of (R + GG) is close to the sum of
F for the children of the node, it is true that the node does not drop packets. Eq 3.10 is the
formal expression of this rule.
Figure 3.18 Example of correct R, GG and F
∀i ∈ CSj Correct(Ri, Fij)
∧
∑
∀i∈CSj
(Ri +GGi)
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj
Fij ⇒ ¬Drop(j) (3.10)
Rule 8: This rule is based on the relation between R of a node and F of its children for
the verification of a node as a non-dropper. As explained in Rule 7, if the children of a node
have correct F , the sum of them means the number of packets which the node forwards. Here,
before being forwarded by a node, the packets should be received by the node. Thus, correct
R of a node must be close to the sum of F for its children if the node does not drop packets.
For example, in Fig. 3.19, R3 = F13 + F23. In sum, with correct R of a node and correct F for
its children, if R of the node is close to the sum of F for its children, it is true that the node
does not drop packets. Eq. 3.11 expresses this.
[∀i ∈ CSj Correct(Fij)] ∧ Correct(Rj)
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Figure 3.19 Example of correct R of a parent and F for its children
∧[Rj .=
∑
∀i∈CSj
Fij ]⇒ ¬Drop(j) (3.11)
Extended rules
Until now, we explain the rules which always hold even if all the neighborings of a node
are compromised. However, the ability to find compromised nodes decreases as the number
of compromised nodes increases with these rules due to strict relation checking. Thus, we
extend the basic rules to the rules which hold unless a node and all its neighboring nodes are
compromised at the same time, which is a rare case.
Extended rule 1: As explained in Rule 7 and 8, the summation of F for the children of
a node represents the number of packets which the node forwards and it is close to R of the
node. Hence, if F for the children of a node is correct and its sum is close to R of the node, R
of the node might be correct like in Fig. 3.20. However, we still have to consider the case that
R of the node is falsified like in Fig. 3.21. A node 2 receives 100 packets but forwards only 50
packets. F12 is correct and F12 = R2. However, R2 is not correct.
To overcome this case, we consider R of a node as well as the children of the node. If R
of a node is also close to the sum of (R+GG) for the children of the node, R of the node is
correct unless all the children of the node are compromised to hold this. Eq. 3.12 is the formal
expression of this.
[∀i ∈ CSj Correct(Fij)] ∧ [Rj .=
∑
∀i∈CSj
Fij ]
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Figure 3.20 Relation for R of a parent, F and GG of its children
Figure 3.21 A child has correct F but a parent has wrong R
∧[Rj .=
∑
∀i∈CSj
(Ri +GGi)]⇒ Correct(Rj) (3.12)
Extended rule 2: This rule is based on the relation between a node and its grandchildren.
F of a node means the number of packets which its parent receives from the node and forwards.
They are also received by its grandparent. Therefore, R of a node includes the packets of F
for its grandchildren as well as GG of its children (corresponds to the generated packets by its
children). For example, in Fig. 3.22, F15 + F25 + GG5 + F36 + F46 + GG6 = R7. Hence, if R
of a node is close to the sum of F for its grandchildren and GG of its children together, there
is some possibility that R of the node and F of its grandchildren are correct unless the node
and all its grandchildren are compromised. Additionally, if R for each child of a node is close
to the sum of F of its grandchildren for each child, the possibility becomes higher since this
means that each child of the node is more likely to forward all the packets which it receives.
In Fig. 3.22, F15 + F25 = R5 and F36 + F46 = R6. To summarize, if the sum of F for its
grandchildren and GG of its children are close together to R of the node and the sum of F of
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its grandchildren for each child is close to R of each child, R of the node, R of its children and
F of its grandchildren are correct unless the node, all its children and all its grandchildren are
compromised. Eq. 3.13 expresses this rule.
Figure 3.22 Grand-relation for R, F and SF
i ∈ CSj , j ∈ CSk [Rk .=
∑
∀i,j
(Fij +GGj)]
∧[∀j ∈ CSk Rj .=
∑
∀i
Fij ]
⇒ ∀i, j, k Correct(Rk, Rj , Fij) (3.13)
Extended rule 3: This rule also uses grand-relation. As explained in Rule 3, (R + GG)
of a node is close to (F+SF ) of its child. In Fig. 3.23, F12 + SF12 = R2 + GG2. This can be
extended to between a node and some of its grandchildren. R of a node is close to the sum of
(F+SF ) for a grandchild from each child. For example, in Fig. 3.24, R3 = F12 + SF12. Hence,
if these two relations hold among a node, its children and its grandchildren, we can say that R
of the node, R of its children and F or SF for some of its grandchildren are correct. Eq. 3.14
is the formal expression of this.
i ∈ CSj , j ∈ CSk [Rk .=
∑
∃i,∀j
(Fij + SFij)]
∧[∀j ∈ CSk (Rj +GGj) .=
∑
∃i
(Fij + SFij)]
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Figure 3.23 Example of correct F , SF , R and GG
Figure 3.24 Example of correct R, F and SF between a node and its grandchildren
⇒ ∃i, ∀j, k Correct(Rk, Rj)
∧[Correct(Fij)⇒ Correct(SFij) ∨ Correct(SFij)⇒ Correct(Fij)] (3.14)
Extended rule 4: This rule is based on the relation between EF , F and R. EF and F
commonly count the number of packets which are forwarded by a node; EF by a node and F
by a parent of a node. Thus, if EF of a node is close to the sum of F for its children, we can
claim that F might be correct. For example, in Fig. 3.25, EF2 = 100 and EF2 = F12.
However, there is one case that F is not correct even if EF of a node is close to the sum
of F for its children. The children of a node are compromised to hold this. For example, in
Fig. 3.26, F13 = 25 but a node 1 changes it into 15 and a node 2 also changes F23 into 20. To
deal with this case, we use the relation between R of a node and the sum of F for its children.
If R of the node is close to the sum of F for its children, F is more likely correct. These two
hold together unless the node and all its children are compromised. Eq. 3.15 expresses this
rule.
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Figure 3.25 Example of EF and correct F
Figure 3.26 Example of compromised F
[EFj
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj
Fij ] ∧ [Rj .=
∑
∀i∈CSj
Fij ]⇒ ∀i ∈ CSj Correct(Fij) (3.15)
In the following, the algorithm 1 shows how to apply the rules to find compromised nodes
and the algorithms from 2 to 13 show how to use each rule as a function for each rule.
3.3 Catching packet droppers and modifiers in wireless sensor networks
Like the work presented in the previous subsections, this work is also to catch packet drop-
pers and modifiers. In the scheme, the sensory data is transmitted along the tree rooted at a
sink while each packet sender or forwarder adds a small number of extra bits, which is called
packet marks, to the packet. Based on the packet marks, the sink can figure out the dropping
rate associated with every sensor node, and then run our proposed node categorization algo-
rithm to identify nodes that are droppers/modifiers for sure or suspicious droppers/modifiers.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm to find compromised nodes
Topology Input for ∀i
- CS, the set of the children
- SS, the set of the siblings
- DEPTH, the depth
Topology Input for a routing tree
- MAXD, the maximum depth of a routing tree
- P , the set of the nodes on the path for each source
Report Input for ∀i
- SG, GG, EF , R, F , SF
Output
- Identities of the nodes which have wrong R, F , SF values or are identified as droppers
1: repeat
2: repeat {/*This loop is to identify wrong or correct reports.
Note: only reports identified as correct can be used in identifying droppers/non-
droppers*/}
3: Rule1(CS, DEPTH, MAXD, GG, R)
4: ExtenedRule2(CS ,GG, R, F )
5: ExtenedRule1(CS ,GG, R, F )
6: ExtenedRule4(CS, EF , R, F , SF )
7: ExtenedRule3(CS ,GG, R, F , SF )
8: Rule4(CS, SS, GG, F , SF )
9: Rule2(CS, P , SG, GG, EF , R, F )
10: until Can not find more correct or wrong R, F and SF
11: /*The following rules are applied to identify droppers and non-droppers.
Note: there could be nodes that cannot be determined as dropper or non-dropper, the
set of which can be reduced with the following rules*/
12: Rule7(CS, R, F )
13: Rule8(CS, R, F )
14: Rule5(CS, R, F , ND)
15: Rule6(CS, R, F , ND)
16: Rule3(CS, GG, R, F , SF )
17: until Can not find more droppers or non-droppers
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Algorithm 2 Rule1(CS, DEPTH, MAXD, GG, R)
Paramenters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- DEPTH, the depth for each node
- MAXD, the maximum depth of a routing tree
- GG for each node
- R for each node
Return values
- The identities of the nods which have correct or wrong R
1: for every leaf node i do
2: if Ri = 0 then
3: Ri is correct
4: else
5: Ri is not correct
6: Ri ← 0
7: end if
8: end for
9: for D = MAXD-1 to 1 do
10: if DEPTHj = D then
11: if Ri is correct for ∀i ∈ CSj then
12: if Rj
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj (Ri +GGi) then
13: Rj is correct
14: end if
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
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Algorithm 3 Rule2(CS, P , SG, GG, EF , R, F )
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- P , the set of the nodes on the path for each source
- SG for each node
- GG for each node
- EF for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
Return values
- The identities of the nods which have correct or wrong F
1: for every source s do
2: if SGs > 0 and SGs
.
= GGs then
3: i does not drop packets for ∀i ∈ Ps
4: for all i ∈ Ps do
5: if Ri
.
= EFi then
6: Ri is correct
7: if Fij
.
= Ri +GGi then
8: Fij are correct
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: end if
13: end for
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Algorithm 4 Rule3(CS, GG, R, F , SF , ND)
Parameters
- CS the set of the children for each node
- GG for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
- SF for each node
- ND, the identities of the nodes which are found as non-droppers currently
Return values
- The identities of the nods which have correct or wrong F , SF
1: for every node j do
2: if j does not drop packets and Rj is correct then
3: if Rj +GGj
.
= Fij + SFij then
4: if Fij is correct then
5: SFij is correct
6: else if SFij is correct then
7: Fij is correct
8: end if
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
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Algorithm 5 Rule4(CS, SS, GG, F , SF )
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- SS, the set of the siblings for each node
- GG for each node
- F for each node
- SF for each node
Return values
- The identities of the nods which have correct or wrong SF
1: for every node j do
2: for all i ∈ CSj do
3: if Fkj is correct for ∀k ∈ SSi then
4: if SFij
.
=
∑
∀k∈SSi Fkj +GGj then
5: SFij is correct
6: end if
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
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Algorithm 6 Rule5(CS, R, F , ND)
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
- ND, the identities of the nodes which are found as non-droppers currently
Return values
- The identities of the nodes which are newly found as droppers or non-droppers
1: for every node j do
2: if j does not drop packets then
3: for all i ∈ CSj do
4: if Ri and Fij are correct then
5: if Ri +GGi
.
= Fij then
6: i does not drop packets
7: end if
8: end if
9: end for
10: end if
11: end for
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Algorithm 7 Rule6(CS, R, F , ND)
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
- ND, the identities of the nodes which are found as non-droppers currently
Return values
- The identities of the nodes which are newly found as droppers or non-droppers
1: for every node j do
2: if i does not drop packets for ∃i ∈ CSj then
3: if Ri and Fij are correct then
4: if Ri +GGi
.
= Fij then
5: j does not drop packets
6: end if
7: end if
8: end if
9: end for
Algorithm 8 Rule7(CS, R, F )
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
Return values
- The identities of the nodes which are newly found as droppers or non-droppers
1: for every node j do
2: if Ri is correct for ∀i ∈ CSj then
3: if Fij is correct for ∀i ∈ CSj then
4: if
∑
∀i∈CSj Ri
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj Fij then
5: j does not drop packets
6: end if
7: end if
8: end if
9: end for
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Algorithm 9 Rule8(CS, R, F )
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
Return values
- The identities of the nodes which are newly found as droppers or non-droppers
1: for every node j do
2: if Fij is correct for ∀i ∈ CSj then
3: if Rj is correct then
4: if Rj
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj Fij then
5: j does not drop packets
6: end if
7: end if
8: end if
9: end for
Algorithm 10 ExtenedRule1(CS, GG, R, F )
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- GG for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
Return values
- The identities of the nods which have correct R
1: for every node j do
2: if Fij is correct for ∀i ∈ CSj then
3: if Rj
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj Fij then
4: if Rj
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj (Ri +GGi) then
5: Rj is correct
6: end if
7: end if
8: end if
9: end for
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Algorithm 11 ExtenedRule2(CS ,GG, R, F )
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- GG for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
Return values
- The identities of the nods which have correct R, F
1: for every node k do
2: if Rk
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj&∀j∈CSk Fij +GGj then
3: if Rj
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj Fij then
4: Rk, Rj and Fij are correct for ∀i ∈ CSj and ∀j ∈ CSk
5: end if
6: end if
7: end for
As the tree structure dynamically changes every certain time interval, behaviors of sensor nodes
can be observed in a large variety of scenarios. In addition, as the information of node behav-
iors has been accumulated, the sink periodically run our proposed heuristic ranking algorithms
to identify most likely bad nodes from suspiciously bad nodes whose number are potentially
large. Global Ranking-Based (GR) Method is based on the heuristic that, the more times a
node is identified as suspiciously bad, the more likely it is a bad node. Stepwise Ranking-Based
(SR) method reduces the value of node v′s accused account by the times that u and v have
been suspected together once a bad node u is identified, for any other node v that has been
suspected together with node u since the GR method will misaccuse innocent nodes that have
frequently been parents or children of bad nodes. Hybrid Ranking-Based (HR) Method con-
cerns the possibility that an innocent node being framed by bad nodes is also considered by
not choosing the nodes who have always being suspected together with already-identified bad
nodes and after selecting a most likely bad node, choses the one which has the highest accused
account value among the rest if the node has not always been accused together with the bad
nodes that have been identified already. The simulation results show that the hybrid ranking
is the best ranking algorithm among the three for its high detection rate and low false positive
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Algorithm 12 ExtenedRule3(CS ,GG, R, F , SF )
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- GG for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
- SF for each node
Return values
- The identities of the nods which have correct F , SF
1: for every node k do
2: if Rk
.
=
∑
∀j∈CSk&∃i∈CSj (Fij + SFij) then
3: if (Rj +GGj)
.
= (Fij + SFij) for ∃i ∈ CSj , ∀j ∈ CSk then
4: Rk, Rj are correct
5: if Fij is correct then
6: SFij is correct
7: else if SFij is correct then
8: Fij is correct
9: end if
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
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Algorithm 13 ExtenedRule4(CS, EF , R, F , SF )
Parameters
- CS, the set of the children for each node
- R for each node
- EF for each node
- R for each node
- F for each node
- SF for each node
Return values
- The identities of the nods which have correct F
1: for every node j do
2: if EFj
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj Fij then
3: if Rj
.
=
∑
∀i∈CSj Fij then
4: Fij are correct for ∀i ∈ CSj
5: end if
6: end if
7: end for
and almost all bad nodes can be identified after 8 rounds regardless of the attack model. It is
also shown that the less the number of bad nodes, the easier to identify these nodes and as the
threshold to categorize nodes is higher, the detection rate becomes lower. The collusion among
nodes also makes the detection rate lower.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Using ns2, we conduct extensive simulation to evaluate the performance of our proposed
scheme. We study the failed-detection rate (i.e., the percentage of packet droppers that are not
identified) as the density of networks and the percentage of droppers vary. We simulate three
different network settings: 101 nodes (including the base station) deployed to 300 × 300m2
area (denoted as 300× 300), 101 nodes deployed to 400× 400m2 area (denoted as 400× 400),
and 101 nodes deployed to 500× 500m2 (denoted as 500× 500). In all simulation results, each
packet dropper drops 50% of the packets which are supposed to be forwarded.
4.1 Impact of network density on failed-detection rate
In Fig. 4.1, we show the failed-detection rate as the network density varies. Here, the num-
ber of regular sensor nodes is 100, natural dropping rate of packets (due to channel noises,
interference, and other environmental factors) is 1%, mis-overhearing rate is 3%, and the num-
ber of detection rounds is 5. We show the result in two cases: when 10% nodes are droppers
and when 20% nodes are droppers. As can be seen, as the network density decreases, the
failed-detection rate increases. This is because, as the network density decreases, each dropper
has less neighbors that can monitor its behavior.
4.2 Impact of natural dropping rate and mis-overhearing on
failed-detection rate
In reality, some packets are dropped not only by the attackers but also by environment
factors such as interference. Additionally, a node can not overhear the communication of its
neighboring nodes perfectly. Thus, we study how these factors affect the performance of our
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Figure 4.1 Failed-detection rate vs. network density
scheme. Let the dropping rate affected by environmental reasons vary from 1% to 6% and mis-
overhearing rate vary from 3% to 8%. In Fig. 4.2, the horizontal axis presents three different
combinations of the natural dropping rates and the mis-overhearing rates, and the vertical axis
represents the failed-detection rates with these three combinations. In addition, two different
settings of network density are considered: 100 nodes deployed to 300× 300m2 and 100 nodes
deployed to 400× 400m2.
As can be seen, the larger are the natural dropping/mis-overhearing rates, the higher is the
failed-detection rate. The reason is that the allowed error range for R, F and SF increases as
the natural dropping/mis-overhearing rates increase. Consequently, even though some droppers
drop some of its received packets, they could be protected from being detected.
Figure 4.2 Failed-detection rate vs. natural dropping rate and mis-overhearing rate
37
4.3 Impact of percentage of droppers on failed-detection rate
In Fig. 4.3, the horizontal axis represents the percentage of all droppers and the vertical
axis represents the corresponding failed-detection rates. The natural dropping rate is 1% and
mis-overhearing rate is 3%. The number of detection rounds is 5. The results were shown in two
network settings: 100 nodes deployed to 300× 300m2 and 100 nodes deployed to 400× 400m2.
Figure 4.3 Failed-detection rate vs. percentage of droppers
As the number of droppers increases, the failed-detection rate also increase. This is because
the number of neighboring nodes which make correct monitoring reports on a path decreases.
This becomes more clear when we compare the setting of 300× 300m2 to the setting of 400×
400m2. In the 400 × 400m2 setting, the failed-detection rate increases faster than in the
300 × 300m2 setting as the number of compromised nodes increases. Let’s think about the
number of neighboring nodes for each node in two areas. To find droppers, we need at least
one innocent neighboring node for each dropper. The network in the 400× 400m2 setting has
lower density and so the percentage that each dropper has no innocent neighboring node is
higher than that in the 300× 300m2 setting.
4.4 Impact of detection rounds on failed-detection rate
In Fig. 4.4, the horizontal axis represents the number of detection rounds, and the vertical
axis represents the corresponding failed-detection rates. The number of nodes is 100, the
natural dropping rate is 1% and the mis-overhearing rate is 3%. The area is 400× 400m2. As
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can be seen, as the number of rounds increases, the failed-detection rate drops. This is because
more paths are used to forward packets from a source and the number of paths where any node
does not drop packets increases. This increase helps the base station to find innocent nodes.
However, the number of paths where some nodes drop packets also increases but these paths
cross the paths where any node does not drop packets. Thus, the innocent nodes on the paths
without packets dropped can accuse the droppers on the paths with packets dropped.
Figure 4.4 Failed-detection rate vs. number of detection rounds
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this thesis, we propose a simple yet effective scheme to identify packet droppers. This
scheme only requires sending and forwarding nodes to report their observations to a base
station, and the base station can analyze the reports, identify inconsistencies in the reports,
and then locate the intruders using two kinds of the rules we propose. The basic rules hold
regardless of the number of compromised neighboring nodes since they are based on consistent
relation for the report of the base station and each node and the extended rules hold unless
a node and all its neighboring nodes are compromised at the same time, which is a rare case.
Extensive simulations have been conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the scheme. In
the simulations, the failed-detection rate increases as the network density decreases. This is
because, as the network density decreases, each dropper has less neighbors that can monitor its
behavior. It is also shown that the larger are the natural dropping/mis-overhearing rates, the
higher is the failed-detection rate. The reason is that the allowed error range for R, F and SF
increases as the natural dropping/mis-overhearing rates increase. As the number of droppers
increases, the failed-detection rate also increase. The main cause for this is that the number of
neighboring nodes which make correct monitoring reports on a path decreases. As the number
of rounds increases, the failed-detection rate also drops. This is because more paths are used to
forward packets from a source and the number of paths where any node does not drop packets
increases. The proposed scheme can also tolerate malicious reports, natural packet dropping
and so on.
As a future work, the distinction of dropping by environment factor such as interference
from dropping by compromised nodes might give better performance. The range for the valid
value of R, F and SF can be also adjusted as the packet reception rate of the base station for
over all sensor nodes changes.
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